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Abstract
A recent paper (Gerten et al 2013 Environ. Res. Lett. 8 034032) finds very different
global warming thresholds of concern between water scarcity and ecosystem changes.
This may at first appear surprising, as each process is controlled to some extent by
functioning of the land surface. Hence this analysis reflects the fundamentally different
character of what constitutes water scarcity among people, compared to water stress for
ecosystems. Gerten et al (2013 Environ. Res. Lett. 8 034032) find both responses to
warming are highly nonlinear, but in opposite senses. Water scarcity could affect multiple
millions of people for even low levels of warming, but that number would almost stabilize
should warming continue. In contrast, ecosystem changes become massively more
responsive to climate change at higher warming levels. This re-iterates how complex the
Earth system is, making it difficult to determine what constitutes overall single thresholds
of climate change society may choose to consider avoiding. However, it is argued here
that such targets are still much needed, providing a focal point for discussion, and
complexity should not be used as an excuse to prevent setting them.
1. Main paper
It is difficult to imagine any other scientific endeavour that has been subjected to
so much public scrutiny as climate change. As research underpins climate
prediction and associated impacts, it might be expected that this should lead to
concise answers. What, precisely, constitutes safe levels of altered atmospheric
greenhouse concentrations? Then any broader debate is free to concentrate solely
on what level of warming might be deemed unacceptable based on projected
impacts—and ask the question: how can the global economy implement
emissions reductions to avoid crossing a dangerous threshold? However, in many
respects this has not yet happened. The argument is made here that this lack of
progress is because, despite vigorous efforts to explain the enormous complexity
of the Earth system, there remain major uncertainties. The recent paper by Gerten
et al (2013) is particularly important in this context, as it additionally highlights
how the impacts responses to climate change are also highly complex.
There have been two decades of comprehensive high-resolution modelling of
the climate system, aided through (a) step changes in computational availability
and (b) much better and longer measurement datasets to inform process
parameterization. Major advances have occurred in understanding functioning of
the atmosphere, oceans, terrestrial ecosystems, cryosphere and all interactions
between them. Yet the uncertainty bounds on climate sensitivity, the amount of
warming for a doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations, remains
stubbornly large (IPCC 2013). Although it is totally correct to disclose in full this
uncertainty in current knowledge, unfortunately it has the side-effect of forcing a
polarization in the debate. Some green pressure groups may select the upper
predictions of change, and give a potentially overly pessimistic and thus alarmist
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assessment of the evolution of the human–climate system. Other pressure groups
do the opposite, and equate uncertainty as meaning the science is simply wrong.
The latter attempt to debunk everything to do with climate change, including
attributes we do know with more certainty, such as an almost certain human
fingerprint on the general warming record to date (Stott et al 2006). This
polarization, preventing informed and inclusive debate, in itself constitutes a real
threat. It makes it more difficult for society to assess and discuss the risks of
global warming and prepare for any related impacts.
In wondering as to how we have ended up in this situation, a recent paper in
this journal (Gerten et al 2013) provides an excellent microcosm of the competing
and differential factors that control the full human–climate-impacts system. They
combine projections by different climate models with the LPGmL vegetation
model (Bondeau et al 2007, Sitch et al 2003), discovering that global warming of
2 ◦C, 3.5 ◦C and 5 ◦C would expose an extra 8%, 11% and 13%, respectively, of
the world population to new or enhanced water scarcity. This suggests that even
two degrees of global warming could affect a very large fraction of society, and is
arguably a threshold too high. Yet warming levels beyond that, in relative terms,
do not add substantially to the population affected, indicating nonlinear
saturation. The authors then consider projections of habitat transformation. Again
for warming levels 2 ◦C, 3.5 ◦C and 5 ◦C, they now find major ecosystem changes
reaching levels of 1%, 10% and 74% adjustment to ‘present endemism-weighted
vascular plant species’. First this suggests in this context, two degrees of warming
might be acceptable. Second, it again points to highly nonlinear features, but in
the opposite way, with an acceleration of change for increasing warming
levels—in broad terms is one characteristic of environmental tipping points
(Lenton et al 2008). Add to this differential responses of terrestrial ecosystems to
the mix of any raised atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations (Huntingford
et al 2011), that only recently are geochemical cycle influences on vegetation
being routinely considered, e.g. nitrogen cycle (Thomas et al 2013) and
phosphorous cycle (Mercado et al 2011), and that physiological acclimation
effects need to be included in modelling studies (Huntingford et al 2013), then the
overall situation becomes even more convoluted to understand.
So what to do? First, we need to assess further the finding of Gerten et al
(2013) that the number affected by water scarcity increases quickly in warming
level before flattening off. Is this because a large fraction of the population
already suffers water scarcity (their figure 3(a), red and dark orange histogram
components)? How large a section of society is sufficiently developed with
appropriate infrastructure that they can cope with almost any change to the
hydrological cycle—and can this be made to increase in to the future, which
would further flatten the responses? What is the influence on projections of using
a single metric for defining chronic water scarcity of 1000 m3 per capita per year
(Falkenmark and Widstrand 1992)? However, this work also suggests something
more fundamental is also needed. Paradoxically, given so much complexity, there
emerges a desperate requirement for simple-to-understand specifications of what
might constitute generally safe bounds. Hence there is a very persuasive
argument—and one this author believes—that even if the current values of such
bounds are not precisely known, target specification does provide a quantity to
focus thinking in policy circles. It also focuses research, allowing the implications
of new findings to be routinely translated into refining any such climate targets,
and keeps the pressure on to reduce model parameter uncertainty. The
two-degrees limit is now the most widely used threshold, emerging in part from
the ‘burning embers’ diagrams that featured in the 3rd IPCC assessment (IPCC
2001). And as an example of reassessment, Smith et al (2009) argue such burning
embers diagrams were overly optimistic. Even to limit global warming to two
degrees will require major ongoing emissions reductions, and soon (Huntingford
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et al 2012). However, here too there is complexity, as there is some flexibility
between slightly later deeper cuts, or slower emissions decreases but starting
almost immediately. Fortunately, therefore, a second summary threshold is
emerging that encapsulates this degree of freedom. The long atmospheric lifetime
of carbon dioxide allows a single cumulative remaining total of ‘allowable’ CO2
emissions to be specified, leaving easier specification of emissions pathways that
meet that total. Allen et al (2009) find that the burning of a trillion tonnes of
carbon since pre-industrial times, across climate sensitivities, ocean diffusivities
and carbon cycle feedbacks, corresponds to a most likely warming of two degrees.
So far we are already over 50% of the way to that cumulative emission total.
Emerging assessments of how the Earth system functions and including
climate feedbacks on the carbon cycle (e.g. Piao et al 2013), or new projections of
expected climate impacts provided by analyses such as Gerten et al (2013),
matter. These may refine the total remaining ‘allowable’ emissions to stay below
two degrees, or potentially demand re-assessment of the two-degrees limit itself
as an appropriate upper level to warming. Exploring of safe planetary boundaries
must continue across a broad range of environmental thresholds (Rockstrom et al
2009), with translation back to warming or total emissions targets. Setting simple
targets remains key to facilitate emission negotiations, even if for the time being
and despite the best research efforts, these are based to some extent on incomplete
knowledge.
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